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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this document is to explore the relationship between land tenure security
and housing investment among households in Bangladeshi poor settlements. Tenure
security is viewed through ownership over the property. Whether people squat, rent, or
own their living space indicates a certain level of tenure security. Level of housing
investment is approached through the physical structure of the house, or more specifically,
floor materials. Cluster-robust standard error logistic regression method is utilized to
explore this relationship in order to fix the issue of households located in the same
settlement being correlated with each other. Households with greater tenure security, either
renters or owner occupants, are more likely than squatters to have cement floors, which are
more permanent and expensive materials then others like bamboo, wood or sand.
However, renters of non-government properties are more likely than owner occupants to
use cement floors. After all, although greater tenure security does have a positive impact
on housing investment, the market force in which housing is seen as a business opportunity
can be a stronger factor in encouraging investment even in poor communities.
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
Due to rapid urbanization and rural-to-urban migration trend, urban poverty has
been growing into an urgent issue of many cities, especially in the developing world. In
addition to that, poor communities are often concentrated in areas with high risks of natural
disaster, social problems or eviction (Coulton & Pandley, 1992). These risks impact
people’s ability to manage and utilize their available assets. Natural disasters cause
problems like flooding or serious waterlogging leading to health issues and burden on
everyday activities. Kids without proper education due to the lack of access to facilities
become stuck in a poverty cycle. Fear of eviction can discourage people from investing in
their housing, and improving their living conditions; and displacement itself is a major
stressor and can lead to loss of material belongings and access to jobs, social connections,
and community resources.
It is clear that environmental characteristics significantly influence people’s ability
to manage and enhance different forms of assets like labor, financial or social capital.
Moreover, effective solutions to help people break out of poverty requires good
understanding this relationship. While most existing anti-poverty policies either focus on
fixing the locational conditions or supporting individuals in terms of assets, better
interventions should result from the people-place interactions (Spencer, 2004).
I am interested in looking into these relationships between place and people, or
more specifically, place characteristics and people’s process and capacity of utilizing their
assets. In order to do that, this thesis investigates the relationship between land tenure
security and housing investment in two Bangladeshi cities: Chandpur, and Narayanganj.
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Land tenure security is comprised of the characteristics of the property, the type of
ownership over it, and the actual perceptions of people about security. It is an important
locational aspect influencing both the use value and the exchange value of the property.
Looking at the level of investment in housing allows us to see how poor people manage
and utilize this asset of land plus housing given the context of the place they live.
This research will provide an understanding of the relationship between locational
aspects and the poor’s asset vulnerability through the lens of land tenure and housing values
supporting the search for comprehensive solutions to the issues of poverty. It should be
emphasized that effective anti-poverty action is not only about giving people the assets to
change the characteristics and values of the place they live but also about understanding
and utilizing the interactions between them.
The thesis will start with a background of the study areas. The second section is a
literature review of studies have been done from various disciplines looking at place values,
land tenure, and housing. The third section is a research design with information about data
collection and statistical method will be used. The results from this analysis will follow in
the fourth section. A discussion and an implementation section will conclude this research.
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Chapter 2. BACKGROUND

Bangladesh is a developing South Asian country bordering India, Myanmar, Nepal,
Bhutan, and China. Despite the small area of about 130,000 sq. km (land), the rapidly
growing population of over 150 million (in 2017) makes it one of the most populous and
dense country in the world (The World Factbook, 2018). Bangladesh experiences a rapid
rate of urbanization due to natural population increase, expansion of urban areas, as well
as rural-to-urban migration. Besides being an indication of growth, urbanization has led to
various urban issues such as lack of urban services, traffic congestions, crimes, and a very
noticeable increase in slums or poor settlements with substandard living conditions. A
significant portion of the urban population live below the poverty line. In 2005, Dhaka, the
capital city, had over 35% of its population considered poor or extremely poor (Ahmed,
2007). Low-quality housing is one of the major problems that the poor have to face. Ninetynine percent live in poor-quality structures, and over 95% of the houses are less than 150
square feet (Ahmed, 2007).
Land tenure security has been drawing lots of attention as the effective action to
improve life of the urban poor. It is interesting to see if there is really connection between
land tenure security and housing quality in Bangladeshi poor settlements. And if yes, what
aspect of land tenure security most impacts the housing condition and how can policy
makers utilize that for future planning and development? Examples from Bangladesh can
be informative for other countries and cities in the developing world facing the same issues
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of urbanization and poverty and looking for effective solutions regarding land tenure and
housing conditions.

Figure 2.1. Narayanganj and Chandpur in Bangladesh

The Bangladeshi cities of Chandpur and Narayanganj are shown in Figure 1 below.
These have been selected as two of the first pilot cities for the National Urban Poverty
Reduction Program by the United Nations, which collects and processes data about urban
poor settlements in Bangladesh in order to support the efforts of reducing urban poverty
and improving people’s livelihood. This would be a great source of information for me to
explore the relationship between land tenure security and housing investment, which might
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be valuable, not only in the context of Bangladesh but also in understanding the
phenomenon in other developing countries.
Chapter 3. LITERATURE REVIEW
There have been numerous studies about land tenure security as well as housing
investment in different contexts. This literature review section looks at those previous
studies in order to explore the approaches, understanding and evidences for the interactions
between these two widely discussed topics. It will start with how land has different values
to people benefiting from using, renting, or selling. As an important aspect of a piece of
land, land tenure is an important factor to be considered. The second and third parts of this
section will explore how people understand tenure security and how that is connected with
housing investment.
3.1.

The values of land - Use value vs. Exchange value
According to Walker (1981), land is one type of commodity which can be used or

exchanged in many ways leading to the two categories of use and exchange values coming
associated with each piece of land. Use value refers to the utilities that can be enjoyed by
the consumption of that commodity or use of land in this case. Use value of the same
commodity is seen differently by people. The same piece of land has different meanings
and importance to its owners. The price that someone willing to pay for the land also
reflects the use value that they think they can obtain from the land.
Exchange value is the value of land when it gets exchanged on the open market
(Clark, 1982). The price is determined by the return on investment that people who rent or
buy the land such as homeowner, landlord, realtors etc. expect to get from that decision
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(Harvey, 2010). People who see the most benefits out of the land would be willing to pay
the highest price for the land thus manage to get it. Under this assumption, land allocation
to maximize the exchange value will also lead to the maximization of use value. However,
as Pivo (1984) noted, this can only happen in a perfectly competitive market. In situation
of monopoly or absolute rent, it is the ones who can absorb the costs and afford high rent
who will eventually have the land. Moreover, land uses also have spillover effects which
are often neglected in the consideration of use values. A beautiful garden is not only
enjoyed by its owner but can also be enjoyed by the neighbors leading to higher use values
than expected.
3.2.

Land tenure - Land tenure security
From the above overview of ideas about values of land, we have seen that many

different aspects contribute to the land value. One important factor or set of factors is the
characteristics of the land itself ranging from the location, size, fertility, etc. Land tenure
is an important factor in how residents value the land.
Especially in the context of poor communities, having access to secure shelter very
important for them to enhance their livelihood. Hence the importance of land ownership
and land tenure has been widely recognized. DFID (2002) has set ensuring land tenure
security as one of the major efforts aiming at poverty reduction. But what does it mean to
have land tenure? And does land tenure actually constitute people’s security?
Emergence of property rights to land
Deininger and Feder (2001) explained the process of individualization of land
property rights as response to increase in population, technical change, and the capital
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market growth. During the early stage of development, land was normally under communal
property system and the use of land is temporal mostly for cultivation. With the increase
in population, land become scarcer, intra-community land rental came into existence
making the tenure system more complex and requiring better definition of property rights
to land. Moreover, with the increase in technical change, more profits can be gained from
the use of land leading to higher value in land especially of certain quality asking for good
definition of rights over land. With the growth of markets for output, capital, and insurance,
having the rights to land can lead to the reduction of risk as it brings promise of reliable
income from crops or different types of off-farm income such as financial credits. Through
its long emergence and evolution, land rights can now be put into and viewed by the system
of land tenure which is now reviewed in the following section.
Land tenure – A system for property rights
Land tenure is the specified rights to the land (Payne, 2004). FAO (2002) has
defined land tenure as a system which influences the relationships among people with
respect to land specifying the rights to use, or exchange the land and responsibilities over
it. Depending on different tenure system in various areas, land tenure is classified in many
different ways. However, the classification is normally based on statutory categories like
‘freeholder’, ‘leaseholder’, and non-statutory ones like ‘squatter owner’, ‘squatter tenants’
and ‘others’ (Payne, 2004). Along with each of the statutory categories are specific rights
to the property. As a result, having tenure status is normally associated with having proper
rights to the properties thus the security over their ownership and control over the property.
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Dales (1968) viewed land as an asset for which the different types of ownership
consist of “a bundle of legally-defined user rights.” He also presented the four major types
of ownership arrangement ranging from common-property, restricted common property,
status-tenure/fixed-tenure, and full-tenure. Common-property is the asset which can be
used by everyone. Restricted common-property put some limits on the uses of the assets.
The ownership that gives exclusive rights to use but not transfer the asset is statustenure/fixed-tenure. When the owner is able to use and transfer the asset, it is full
ownership.
Land types – Property rights as an institution
Feder and Feeny (1991) attempted at viewing land rights through the context of the
social and economic institutional structure, including constitutional order – rules about how
society is organized; institutional arrangement - rules specified by the constitutional order;
and normative behavioral codes - cultural values influencing behaviors. Based on the
institutions associated with the land, it is categorized into four categories which also come
along with some set of property rights. According to Feder and Feeny (1991), this
categorization is an ideal analytical tool in understanding the rights to land. Different
several different types of land can be observed in a society. Moreover, although not very
common, a single tract of land can be under more than one types. This way of looking into
land rights offer an additional approach of understanding to the land tenure system
approach.
The concepts of land tenure security
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Effects of land titling programs have been widely investigated as a tool for
development especially for poor communities (Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2006). However,
with the complexity of the tenure system especially in developing countries, property rights
specified by the status and tenure security don’t always match as they should.
So what does it mean to have tenure security? Place et al. (1994) defined that land
tenure security is achieved when people are aware of their rights to use, benefit from the
labor spent on the land, and transfer it. This definition implies both the objective and
subjective components of land tenure security. The objective aspect of it comes from the
recognition and enforcement of rights through certain official or unofficial guarantee
through laws for example. The subjective aspect of it comes from the perceptions of the
owners about their own security.
Van Gelder (2010) proposed a tripartite approach to tenure security consisting of
de jure, de facto, and perceived tenure security. De jure or legal tenure is the most widely
mentioned aspect of tenure security. Legal property rights specified by legal status is
widely believed as an important factor for security (De Soto 2000.) With this approach,
tenure is normally thought of as legal status implying security or lack of security in terms
of tenure. Varley (2013) believed this dichotomous approach to legal tenure security is not
sufficient, especially in the context of complicated tenure systems in developing countries
where tenure. Another important aspect is de facto security, which has also been widely
studied (Nakamura, 2014). De facto security is gained by the “(f)actual situation on the
ground” rather than legal status influencing how secure people feel about control over the
property (Van Gelder & Luciano, 2015). There are intrinsic elements contributing to de
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facto tenure security such as the length of occupancy, the size of the settlement, or the level
of community organization. Extrinsic aspects such as third-party support, or political
acceptance can also be counted into de facto security factors (Van Gelder, 2015). Finally,
one’s perceptions of security is also an important aspect of tenure security. This is the
estimate of the household about the chance of eviction they face. This perception of
eviction risk can be affected by threat from individuals or groups, conflicts with neighbors,
gangs, or family members. Moreover, without legal rights to the place they live on, they
might also feel insecure and susceptible to eviction. Thus, both de jure and de facto
contribute to perceived tenure security. However, the magnitude of each’s influence on
perceived security is not clear and dependent on a particular case. Perceptions of people
can also be affected by other factors besides de jure and de facto security. Although legal
tenure security is easier to be aware of and assessed, de facto and perceived tenure security
can be more important especially for poor communities.
3.3.

Connections between land tenure security and housing investment
There have been many studies looking into the relationship between land tenure

security and housing investment and the mechanism behind the possible relationship. From
the previous studies, there are mixed results about whether improved land tenure security
lead to greater housing investment. Studying groups of poor households in outskirts Buenos
Aires, Argentina, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) observed a positive relationship
between having an official land title and investment. Brasselle et al. (2002), found no
effects in Burkina Faso. Seeing that there might be the problem of endogeneity as people
invest in order to get better tenure security, Besley (1995) used instrumental variable to
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investigate this relationship in two Ghanaian regions of Wassa and Anloga. For Wassa,
improved land rights results in greater investment while there is no significant impact in
Anloga. With this mixed result, he suggests looking more into the determinants of rights
based on different types of legal, de facto, and perceptual security as well as the
mechanisms behind the relationship to understand the variation in the relationship between
land tenure and investment in housing
Risk of investment
The first mechanism that can lead to possible impacts of land tenure security on
housing is risk level of investment. Without fear of seisure or eviction, they are more
willing to spend on building up. If the property is under threat of eviction, people run the
risk of losing their investment in housing or infrastructure (Demsetz, 1974). Field (2005)
examined the impacts of the titling program in Peru. He found that the property rights come
with the title encouraged people to invest more on housing renovation. The rate of
residential renovation increased by more than two-third. In addition to that, the increase is
mainly due to the lower threat of eviction. Not only security given by official title but also
the de facto and perceived security are important in influencing the investment decision of
households. Nakamura (2016) analyzed the data about slums in Pune, India and found out
that both legal and de facto tenure lead to stronger perceived rights over land of the people.
This made people more willing to spend on permanent materials for their houses. This is
confirmed by Nyametso (2012) studying poor settlements in Accra, Ghana in terms of
impacts of both legal and de facto customary tenure security. He proved that similar to
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legal, de facto customary play an important role in encouraging people’s willingness to
make investment on housing while not sufficient enough to be the cause of improvement.
Return to investment - Improved housing as an asset
The second mechanism is that tenure security can mean improved transferability
and values of housing as an asset thus incentivizing people to invest more. Formalization
of land tenure can lead to a better functioning housing market (De Soto, 2000; DurandLasserve and Selod, 2007). With legal recognition, the uncertainty of informal housing
market is reduced making it more appealing to investors and also other consumer (Feder
and Feeny, 1991). This turns housing into a tradable, more valuable asset that they can
further invest on and hope for a future return. Moreover, formalization of land tenure often
comes with greater transfer rights. The additional ability to transfer the land encourages
people to increase their investment. Liu et al. (1998) looked at Chinese communities with
different levels of transfer rights. They concluded that the application of green manure (one
form of investment) increased as the level of transfer rights increase. We can see that the
improvement in exchange value of property (either through better functioning market or
greater capacity of people to join the market with transfer rights) can be the way that land
tenure influences the housing investment.
Not only the transferability of the asset but also the better access to infrastructure,
services especially from the government due to increased tenure security allow increase in
housing investment. People having legal tenure tend to be more qualified for government
assistance. They also have better chance to ask for installation of basic services and
infrastructure (Nakamura 2017, Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2007). This enhanced access
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to services and infrastructure has positive impacts on investment in housing (Strassmann.
1984).
Some critique of the improved property rights approach have pointed out negative
effects of the market on life of the people. Although the land and housing markets become
more efficiency and profitable leading to the increase in values of the poverty, the higher
rent and prices can make it harder for the poorest groups to access land and housing in the
areas (Payne, 2004; Gilbert, 2002). As the result, they get pushed out of the community.
Access to credit
Another impact of land tenure security especially through legal security
improvement interventions like formalizing tenure is the increase in access to credit. De
Soto (2000) argued that the legalized rights to the property will help turn it into a live form
of capital. Recorded title allows people to use their house and land as collateral, making it
possible and easier to access credit from the bank. They thus have bigger capital flow to
make investment in either housing and other consumptions and activities (Feder, 1988).
There are, however, mixed results from previous studies exploring the impact of
land tenure security on access to credit. While some found positive relationship between
the two, there are often conditions in order for significant impacts to be obtained. Goyal
and Deininger (2010) studying communities in India have observed the effects of land
registry on borrowing only in urban areas. Feder and Nishio (1998) provided evidence that
several factors, including robust financial market, incentives in land investment, demand
for transactions, and a working system for land registration are required in order to see
some positive impacts of titling on credit access. Feder (1988) highlighted that for areas in
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which people base more on the informal credit market, which values personal relationship,
the difference in credit level with or without title is not significant. There are also studies
in which no or very little effect on credit access can be found in places where formal credit
markets are not present (Carter and Wiebe, 1994). Carter et al. (1996) found out that the
size of the property is an important condition to evaluate the impact of title on credit access.
They observed that smaller-sized property is already excluded from the credit market thus
no effect can be seen due to the title.
Despite the mixed results, in the debate over tenure security and housing
investment, significantly positive relationships are more commonly found. As a result,
interventions focusing on ensuring tenure security such as providing people with titles or
long-term leasehold are becoming more and more popular to solve the issue of low housing
quality and living condition. The government and policy makers’ interventions seem
crucial in order to improve the housing condition especially in the poor community.
In the three mechanisms explained above, we can see the important role of the
ability to participate and benefit from the market as a reason why greater tenure security
can influence housing investment. However, other factors besides tenure security can drive
this ability and in turns affects the level of housing investment. Proponents of market
approach to land allocation believe that in a competitive market the exchange value of land
or housing that the land owner enjoys can reflect that use values which can be gained by
the highest bidder renting or buying the property. Hence this focus on the exchange value
leads to the higher incentive to invest to maintain or improve the property which can be
exchanged and benefited from (Pivo, 1984).
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We can see an interaction between the government and the market force here in
terms of housing investment. While studies focus a lot on how tenure security can influence
housing investment through impacting the transferability and the exchange value of the
property, interventions in poor communities directly focusing on the market and how
people participate in it seem to draw less attention. However, in order to better understand
tenure security and how important it is in encouraging housing investment and
improvement, the fact that people do not only enjoy use value but also exchange value
from their property is important to consider.
3.4.

Summary of literature review
Previous studies have shown that numerous factors influence the values of land,

whether it is use or transfer values. One of the important factors determining land values
is land tenure. Besides de jure or legal tenure, de facto and perceived tenure security are
also important aspects of tenure security. There are mixed findings about how land tenure
security is related to housing investment and improved housing quality, which is critical,
especially in terms of poverty reduction policies.
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Chapter 4. RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to explore the relationship between tenure security and housing investment
in Bangladeshi poor communities, a cross-sectional study of the relationship using a multilevel model of household and community data is utilized. This section will explain the
details about data collection, as well as the statistical model used for analysis.
4.1.

Data Collection
Cities in Bangladesh are divided officially into different wards, which are the

smallest administrative urban geographic unit. Each ward is then informally divided into
mahalla, which are the lowest urban geographic units having identifiable boundaries. Poor
settlements are geographically identifiable areas comprised of a group of households with
one or more of the following characteristics: (i) poor quality housing; (ii) extremely high
risk of flooding; (iii)lack of access to potable water and bathing facilities; (iv) lack of
sanitation facilities; (v) insecure land tenure; (vi) high density slums; (vii) inadequate solid
waste management; (viii) lack of electricity; and (ix) lack of access roads and drainage.
This study looks households in the settlements of Chandpur and Narayanganj. Two
different datasets are available from the National Urban Poverty Reduction Program
(NUPRP) in Bangladesh: the household survey and the urban poor settlement assessment.
The urban poor settlement assessment provides the geographical boundaries of poor
settlements which have not been officially defined before and assessment of the
settlements’ conditions such as social infrastructure and social-economic status. This
assessment is conducted in a six-step participatory urban poor settlement mapping process
as shown in Figure 4.1.

16

Figure 4.1. Steps of Urban Poor Settlement Mapping
(NUPRP 2017)
After necessary materials such as city maps, ward maps, mahalla maps, and score
cards listing indicators of settlements’ socio-economic and physical information have been
prepared in step 1, a consultation workshop is done in the second step to get consent from
the Mayor for the Mapping, and most importantly to identify the community surveyors
involving in the later steps with recommendation from the councilors. Surveyors are local
people from the poor settlements who meet the requirements regarding education level and
experiences in the survey. In each ward, three survey teams of 2 surveyors are selected
from different parts of the ward. In step 3, a ward level participatory workshop is conducted
in order to train the surveyors to conduct the mapping and collect the data for the poor
settlement assessment. In step 4, the community surveyors do transect walks of the
settlements asking people to identify the boundaries of the settlements and score the
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settlement’s indicators. Five to ten percent of the settlements will be cross-checked in step
5 to ensure the quality of the surveying process. All the collected information is then put
into a database and digitized into maps of poor settlements. In step 7, a validation workshop
is held to share the collected information with the mayor, councilors, key slum
development staff, representatives from NGOs, community leaders, mahalla leaders and
federation leaders. Feedback is collected to finalize the maps and data for the assessment.
The final dataset, referred to as a score card, consists of information about
population, number of households in each settlement, age of the settlement, and 14 poverty
indicators. Population indicator calculates the number of people living in each settlement.
Age of settlement refers to the number of years that the settlement has been in existence.
Each of the 14 poverty indicators is ranked on a 1-4 scale, with 1 considered the poorest
condition and 4 considered the best. The dataset covers all settlements (2323) from two
cities Chandpur (439) and Narayanganj (1884.)
The second dataset that I use is the household survey done by NUPRP. This is a
door-to-door survey that includes every household living in poor settlements. This survey
is done in three steps. First of all, member of the community development centers come to
all the settlements and tell people in advance about why and how the surveys will be done.
Then trained surveyors will conduct door-to-door survey using mobile devices, such as
mobile phones or tablets, to input the information from the households. Surveyors and
community leaders will then recheck to make sure all the households have been
interviewed.
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The resultant dataset from the household survey consists of information about the
household head (age, gender, religion, education, employment etc.), information about the
household in general (number of family members, children in the house etc.), and a multidimensional poverty index (floor material, ownership of the house, toilet facilities etc.) The
dataset includes 60705 households in two cities Chandpur (23062), and Narayanganj
(37643).
Possibly due to the inputting process, some of the observations do not contain
information about the settlement name associated with the household, making it impossible
to match them with settlements and look at the group effect for those observations. Hence,
I drop these observations to have a better estimating model. A total of 2840 observations
(4.7%) out of 60705 were dropped.
4.2.

Data Limitation
Both datasets have large observation size. Data collection is also done

systematically and rechecked to ensure accuracy. However, there are still limitations to be
aware of about the data collection in order to have a good analysis. The use of mobile
devices to collect the data might result in some mistakes during the process of asking
questions, answering, receiving information and inputting it into the system. Moreover,
data can be lost while inputting, processing and storing on the server. However, due to the
rechecking process, the chance of this is minor compared to the large dataset.
4.3.

Conceptualization
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The most important concept for this research is “land tenure security.” It is defined
by the NUPRP as the state of having the protection from involuntary and arbitrary eviction.
A sub-concept of land tenure security is “tenure,” which indicates the relationship between
tenant and landlord or property owner. There are two different dimensions of land tenure
security which are de jure and de facto security. De jure security means the legal rights to
the land or security due to the legal title over the land or property. De facto tenure security,
on the other hand, shows the perceptions of people about their control over the land, which
is not due to legal status. Both de jure and de facto security contribute to people’s
perceptions about their land tenure security, which is the estimated risk of being
involuntarily evicted from their own land. For people squatting on their land, factual
situations (de facto) such as the community recognition will be the only sources of tenure
security. For people owning and renting their property, legal (or de jure) rights will add to
their sense of tenure security. Land tenure security will be approached through people’s
ownership of their property, whether they squat, rent or own their living space.
Another major concept is housing investment. It is the level of capital that gets
spent by the household in maintaining and improving their living space and structure. The
most common way to analyze this is through the physical structure of the housing itself.
The picture below (Figure 4.2) shows one of the popular housing typologies that we
observed in Bangladeshi poor communities during our trip there. They are in temporary
condition with bamboo or tin walls and roofs. The more permanent structures were built
out of concrete or bricks, which also cost a lot more.
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Figure 4.2. Tin Houses in Bangladeshi Poor settlements
Figure 4.3 below shows the conceptual model looking into the influence of tenure
security on housing investment. Tenure security influences housing investment, as shown
through the physical housing structure. However, other factors both at household level and
settlement level need to be taken into account to accurately estimate the effects of tenure
security, which are the primary interests. More details about how each concept is
constructed and included in the model come in the next section.
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Settlement Controls
- Distance to city
center, railroad, river
- Road condition
Household Controls
- Use of TV
- Number of
dependents
- Female head

Tenure security
- Ownership

Housing Investment
- Floor Material

Figure 4.3. Conceptual model of housing investment
4.4.

Variable Descriptions
Dependent variable: Cement floors
To measure the level of investment in housing improvement, I use information

about floor materials from the household survey. This information is inputted by the
interviewer observing the main material for the dwelling floor in each household. Possible
answers are: Cement, Earth/sand, Dung, Wood planks, Palm bamboo, and Others. From a
general sense as well as our visit to several settlements in both cities of interest, I assume
houses with cement floors are more stable and of better quality and condition. Moreover,
considering the regular flooding and water logging issues in Bangladeshi cities, it is
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obvious that cement is more of a resistant material than other commonly used floorings
such as wood, bamboo, or earth/sand. As a result, in order to make it easier for building a
model of analysis, I turn the information into a binary variable named cement with two
possible values of 1 (meaning cement is used for flooring) and 0 (meaning cement is not
used for flooring). For an amended model, I also construct an ordinal variable material
with the value of 3 for cement floors, 2 for wood and bamboo floor, and 1 for the chance
that there can be meaningful difference in investment between wood/bamboo and other
types.
Independent variables:
i.

Tenure Security

To measure the level of de jure tenure security, I use information from the
household survey. The survey asks whether the household owns or rents the house they are
living in and whether their property is on government land. Possible answers are: own,
rent on non-government land, rent on government land and squat. Four binary variables
are created to indicate this information. Variable squat is used as reference variable.
ii. Household characteristics control variables
Since household characteristics can influence both the level of investment in
housing and their tenure security, I include some control variables to better indicate the
relationship between the variables of interest.
The first variable is the household head’s employment. From the household survey,
the employment of the household head is asked. A dummy variable hh_employed takes
the value of 1 if the household head has some kind of employment and 0 if the head

23

identifies him/herself as unemployed. Households with employed heads might have better
sources of income leading to their greater ability and willingness to spend more on their
house.
A dummy variable, female, is also included to take into account the household head
gender. It takes the value of 1 if the head is female and 0 if the head is male.
Income level is an important control factor to consider since it can influence the
capacity of the household to invest in their housing. Although I do not have a direct
measure of how much each household earns to control for income, I believe expenditure,
particularly basic expenditures like feeding children and caring for the elderly, can be a
good proxy for income level. The more people have to spend on other needs of the family
like food, transportation or education, the less spare money they have to invest in housing.
I add a variable of number of dependents counting children under 5 and disabled family
members as a proxy for income.
Not only reliable income but also wealth level is an important control variable
influencing investment. Different from income, wealth of a family can be inherited from
parents or gained from other sources. Assets that the households have can reflect their
wealth. I create a dummy variable showing whether the household has television, which
can be considered a luxury asset, in order to control for household wealth.
iii. Settlement control variables
I also add three other variables to control for the location of the settlement that the
household is in. People living closer to city center, river or railroad might have better access
to more stable materials like cement as the transportation cost can be higher for those living
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very far away. Two dummy variables were added to indicate whether the settlement is
within 1 km from the railroad or the river. Continuous variable (dist_cen) is used to
calculate the distance (in km) from the settlement to the district center taken from the
zoning map.
Access to infrastructure is also an important factor influencing both the tenure
security of people living in the area and the likelihood of investing in their structure. Areas
with better infrastructure tend to have a lower risk of eviction. A more secure property also
encourages people to invest more in it since they are not afraid of the return to their
investment. Hence, I add a ranked variable (road) to account for the condition of access
roads in the settlement. This information is taken from the settlement survey.
Table 4.1. List of variables
Variable

Label

Definition

Cement

1 – The
household use
cement floors
0 – The
household not
use cement
floors

Source

Dependent
Variable

Floor material

Whether the
household use
cement floors

Household
Survey

Independent
Variable

Whether the
household squat Squat
their house or
not
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1 – The
household
squat their land
0 – The
household not
squat their land
1 – The
household rent
their land from
government

Household
Survey

Tenure security

Settlement
control
variables

0 – The
household not
rent their land
from
government
1 – The
household rent
their land from
nonWhether the
government
household rent
entity
their house on
0 – The
nonRent_non_gov household not
government
rent their land
land
from nongovernment
entity
Whether the
Own
1 – The
household own
household own
their house
their land
0 – The
household not
own their land
Road
1–no proper
access road
2-Earth/Gravel
with poor
Condition of
maintenance
access road
3– Paved
infrastructure in
without proper
the settlement
side drains and
poor
maintenance
4- Paved with
proper side
drains and well
maintenance
Distance from
the settlement
Distance to the
to the center of Dist_cen
city center in
the city
km
Whether the
1 – The
settlement is
settlement is
within 1km
within 1km
Whether the
household rent
their house on
government
land

Rent_gov
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Household
Survey

Household
Survey

Household
survey

Settlement
Survey

Settlement
Survey

from the
railroad

Whether the
settlement is
within 1km
from the river

Whether the
household has
television

Household control
variables

Number of
dependent

Whether the
head of the
household is
female

4.5.

Rr_1km

River_1km

TV

Dependent

Female

from the
railroad
0 – The
settlement is
more than 1km
from the
railroad
1 – The
settlement is
within 1km
from the river
0 – The
settlement is
more than 1km
from the river
1 – The
household has
TV
0 – The
household does
not have TV
Number of
children under
5 and disabled
members
1 – The
household head
is female
0 – The
household head
is male

Settlement
Survey

Settlement
Survey

Household
Survey

Household
Survey

Household
Survey

Statistical Procedure
I use statistical software Stata 13.0 to process and run analysis models. Quantitative

analysis is taken as the main approach to look into impacts of tenure security on investment
in housing in settlements in the two Bangladeshi cities using the dataset from NUPRP
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collected in 2016. Since the dependent variable is a binary variable, logistic regression is
conducted to identify factors influencing the likelihood of having cement floors.
The data is taken from two nested datasets with household level and settlement
level data. This leads to the concern about the similarity of households within the same
settlement. The effects of being in a cluster can lead to the misestimation of standard errors
(Hox, 1998). This concern about context effects have driven the growing trend of
multilevel estimation strategies. There are many different statistical tools that have been
developed and used by various fields to deal with this issue of clustered/nested data such
as mixed-effects multilevel or hierarchical model from sociology, cluster-robust standard
errors used by economists, or two-step approach popular in political science (Heisig et al.,
2015). Although not all the nested data automatically asks for multilevel modelling,
especially in cases where the primary interest is in level 1 effects and when observations
are relatively independent (intra-class correlation is small), accounting for clustering
effects is always important in order to produce “honest models” (Raudenbush & Bryk,
2012.)
This study utilizes a popular multilevel estimation model, which is Cluster-robust
standard errors for logit model. With a large enough number of clusters, or in this case
settlements (over 50), this model gives quite reliable estimates of the relationship between
variables in a hierarchical dataset. Moreover, unlike other models such as mixed effect and
two-step approaches, the processing, as well as interpretation of results from this model is
much simpler allowing it to be more accessible to people of different fields.
Cluster-robust standard errors logistic model
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The difference between the cluster-robust standard error method with the
conventional logit model relies on the corrected standard errors estimates to account for
the cluster setting (Heisig et al. 2015.) The resultant standard errors will be substantially
larger than the ones from traditional logistic models. The model will look similar to the
traditional logistic regression models. Model (1) shows the model used for the study.
Y = B0 + B1Z + B2Q + B3T + u

(1)

Y = Odd ratio showing likelihood of the household having cement floors
B0, B1, B2 = coefficient variables
Z = Tenure security variables
Q = Settlement control variables
T = Household control variables
u = cluster-robust standard error
Interpretation of the logistic regression model is different from the Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) model. The easiest way to read the coefficients is by the “odds ratio.” Odds
ratio is obtained by taking the exponent constant (~ 2.72) and raising it to the power of the
coefficient Bi. An odds ratio of more than 1 implies a positive relationship. For example,
an odds ratio of 1.20 can be read as 1 unit increased in the independent variable results in
a 1.20 time increase in likelihood that dependent variable equals 1. An odds ratio lower
than 1 display a negative relationship. For example, an odds ratio of 0.70 means that 1 unit
increased in the independent variable results in 30% decrease in likelihood that the
dependent variable equals to 1.
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Although quite flexible and easy to use, cluster-robust standard errors model also
has some potential drawbacks. The most important weakness of this model is that a large
number of clusters or groups are required for accurate estimations. The suggested size is
50 or more clusters (Kezdi 2004; and Heisig 2017.) When the number of clusters falls
below the suggested level, other methods or corrections are needed. Since the cluster
number is not a problem for these datasets, cluster-robust standard error is a quite useful
and appropriate method to use.
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Chapter 5. RESULTS
5.1.

Descriptive statistics
This subsection gives a brief overview of all observed households in terms of their

housing material (floor material) and other factors including household characteristics and
the settlements that they live in. Of all 56,334 households in this analysis, 32686 (or 58%)
have cement floors. Table 5.1 below presents a brief summary of all the variables.
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics
Standard
Variable

Observations

Female =1

17080

Cement = 1

32696

Squat=1
rent_gov=1

Mean

deviation

min

max

8495
67

rent_nongov =1

24911

own=1

22861

rail_1km=1

29162

river_1km=1

41503

tv=1

32534

road

56399

1.86

0.946

1

4

dependent

56399

1.08

0.703

0

10

dis_cen

56399

2250.76

2531.62

0

10917.8
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Table 5.2 shows numbers of household with and without cement floors in terms of
ownership types over the land they are living on. We can see that higher percentages of
households owning and especially renting their house not from the government have
cement floors. In contrast, more than 5,000 out of 8,495 households squatting on their land
do not use cement as their floor material. Among group renting from the government, we
also see a greater portion using floor materials other than cement. This suggests that having
more legal rights to the property has some positive effects on housing structure investment.
Table 5.2. Floor material and Ownership type
ownership
rent-gove rent-nong

cement

squat

No

5,121
60.28

36
53.73

Yes

3,374
39.72

Total

8,495
100.00
Pearson chi2(3) =

own

Total

7,757
31.14

10,734
46.95

23,648
41.98

31
46.27

17,154
68.86

12,127
53.05

32,686
58.02

67
100.00

24,911
100.00

22,861
100.00

56,334
100.00

2.6e+03

Pr = 0.000

.

Table 5.3 below shows the road conditions that poor households in the two cities
experience. Over 80% of them either have no proper access road or have only earth/gravel
with poor maintenance. From Table 5.4, we can see some relationship between the road
conditions and the use of cement as floor materials. Households with the worst access road
conditions are less likely to have cement floors. Within the group of households having
better road conditions, a higher percentage of them have cement floors. However, the
increase in percentage is a bit small. Moreover, the group with “Paved with proper side
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drains and well maintenance” roads actually sees a lower percentage of cement-floor
houses than the one with “Paved without proper side drains and poor maintenance” road
condition. Considering this along with other factors might help clarify whether there is any
impact of infrastructure (roads in this case) on the choice of housing floor, as well as how
strong that impact is.
Table 5.3. Road condition of in poor households
road

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

No proper access road
Earth/Gravel with poor maintenance
Paved without proper side drains and po
Paved with proper side drains and well

24,281
21,559
4,973
5,585

43.05
38.23
8.82
9.90

43.05
81.28
90.10
100.00

Total

56,398

100.00

Table 5.4. Road condition and housing material
cement
No

road

Yes

Total

No proper access road

12,749
52.51

11,532
47.49

24,281
100.00

Earth/Gravel with poo

7,533
34.94

14,026
65.06

21,559
100.00

Paved without proper

1,534
30.85

3,439
69.15

4,973
100.00

Paved with proper sid

1,887
33.79

3,698
66.21

5,585
100.00

Total

23,703
42.03

32,695
57.97

56,398
100.00

Pearson chi2(3) =

1.9e+03

Pr = 0.000

A large portion of the households (about 74%) live in settlements which are within
1km of the river. There is no strong relationship between proximity to the river and the
likelihood of using more stable housing materials (cement). Table 5.5 shows that the
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percentage of households with cement floors within 1km from the river is a bit lower (2%
lower) than that of the group living further away.
Table 5.5. Proximity to river and housing material
Within 1km from river
No
Yes

cement

Total

No

6,509
43.70

17,194
41.43

23,703
42.03

Yes

8,387
56.30

24,309
58.57

32,696
57.97

Total

14,896
100.00

41,503
100.00

56,399
100.00

Pearson chi2(1) =

23.1417

Pr = 0.000

Proximity to the railroad seems to have some relationship to the likelihood of
households using cement floors. From Table 5.6 below we can see that for the group living
within 1 km of the railroad, a much higher percentage have cement floors (63%) compared
to households living further away (52%).
Table 5.6. Cement and proximity to the railroad

cement

Within 1km from the
railroad
No
Yes

Total

No

12,925
47.45

10,778
36.96

23,703
42.03

Yes

14,312
52.55

18,384
63.04

32,696
57.97

Total

27,237
100.00

29,162
100.00

56,399
100.00

Pearson chi2(1) = 636.6435
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Pr = 0.000

Besides the settlement characteristics, household features like number of
dependents, the use of television, and the gender of the head can also impact the level of
investment in housing. Of all the households, about 58% have television. For those with
television, a quite high percentage own cement floors (about 70%). We can also see from
Table 5.7 that among households without a TV, the percentage using cement floors drops
to about 41%. This confirms our asumption that wealthier families (having TV) have more
resources to invest in their housing as well.
Table 5.7. Cement and the use of TV
tv
cement

No

Yes

Total

No

13,990
58.62

9,713
29.85

23,703
42.03

Yes

9,875
41.38

22,821
70.15

32,696
57.97

Total

23,865
100.00

32,534
100.00

56,399
100.00

Pearson chi2(1) =

4.7e+03

Pr = 0.000

Most households (about 97%) in the study area have three or fewer dependents,
calculated as number of children under 5 and disabled members. The Pearson’s correlation
of 0.164 suggests a weak and positive relationship between the number of dependents and
the use of cement floors. This conflicts with the assumption that more dependents would
require greater expenditure on basic needs taking away resources for housing
improvement. This weak positive relationship might reflect the fact that dependents work
and support their family instead of being only a burden.
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From the descriptive statistics, we can see some correlations between the use of
cement and factors like ownership over the property, use of TV, proximity to river or
railroad, as well as road conditions. However, digging further into the data with the
proposed multilevel estimation is important for more reliable conclusions. The results of
this model will be presented in the next subsection.
5.2.

Cluster-robust standard errors logistic regression model
Table 5.7 below shows the results from running a logistic regression corrected with

cluster robust standard errors. The coefficients have been calculated by the tool and
displayed in odds ratio for easier interpretation. From the table, we can see that renting
from government and own variable is significant at 95% significance level. People who
own are about 1.4 times more likely to have cement floors than those who squat.
Surprisingly, people who rent their property not from the government are about 2.8 times
more likely to have cement floors than those who squat, which is an even higher likelihood
than people owning their place. A similar model ran with owner occupants as the reference
group shows that renters of non-government properties are about twice as likely than owner
occupants to have cement floors. Those who rent from the government don’t see any
significant difference from squatters in terms of the floor materials they use. This result
suggests that greater legal rights from owning or renting houses on the private market do
have positive impact on the likelihood of having a more permanent housing structure. Since
the number of households renting from the government is very small (67) compared to
other types of ownership, the evidence is not reliable to draw any conclusion about this
group.
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Among the control variables, both the household characteristics (number of
independent and possession of TV, the type of land they live on) and neighborhood
characteristics (proximity to railroad, distance to city center) are significant variables.
Households with more dependents are more likely (1.35 times) to have cement floors. This
is contradictory to the assumption that more dependents mean higher basic expenditures
leading to less available resources to spend on housing. This might be due to the fact that
dependents like children and disabled people are actually the human capital working to
support their family more than an additional burden on other members. Compared to the
number of dependents, TV, the indicator of wealth has much stronger influence on the use
of cement floors. Those with a TV are 3.27 times more likely to also invest in their cement
floors.
Access to road infrastructure and railroad are very significant factors determining
the likelihood of the household having cement floors. An increase in quality of road
condition results in an increase of 1.26 times in the likelihood of the household having
cement floors. Households living in the settlement within 1km of the railroad experience
an increased likelihood (1.37 times) to have cement floors. These findings align with the
hypothesis that better neighborhood conditions like access to infrastructure and amenities
can encourage people to invest more in their own properties.
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Table 5.8. Logistic regression with cluster-robust standards error results
Logistic regression

Number of obs
Wald chi2(10)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log pseudolikelihood = -33976.013

=
=
=
=

56398
685.69
0.0000
0.1146

(Std. Err. adjusted for 1792 clusters in settlement)

cement

Odds Ratio

rent_gov
rent_nongov
own
female
tv
dependent
road
dis_cen
river_1km
rail_1km
_cons

1.459039
2.765697
1.413721
.9576896
3.273312
1.346515
1.255677
.9999606
.9169314
1.366076
.193515

Robust
Std. Err.
.5284175
.4786396
.2397715
.0369476
.2236047
.090529
.0612321
.0000184
.123137
.1744294
.0492912

z
1.04
5.88
2.04
-1.12
17.36
4.43
4.67
-2.14
-0.65
2.44
-6.45

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.297
0.000
0.041
0.262
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.032
0.518
0.015
0.000

.7174454
1.970122
1.013905
.8879439
2.863127
1.180275
1.141221
.9999245
.7047366
1.063624
.1174629

2.967188
3.882541
1.971197
1.032914
3.742262
1.53617
1.381612
.9999967
1.193018
1.754534
.3188075

For the purpose of comparison, I also run the data again using mixed-effect model,
which I don’t go into great details to account for cluster effects. Results from this method
also show quite similar patterns as the cluster-robust standard error models. However, in
this model, the effect of renting from government land also becomes significant. Moreover,
the proximity to the river has significant negative relationship with having cement floors.
Table 5.9 shows the results from the mixed-effect model.
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Table 5.9. Mixed-effects logistic regression result
Mixed-effects logistic regression
Group variable: settlement

Number of obs
Number of groups

Integration points =
7
Log likelihood = -27087.938

cement

Odds Ratio

rent_gov
rent_nongov
own
female
tv
dependent
road
dis_cen
river_1km
rail_1km
_cons

2.1101
1.899703
1.437007
.9249137
3.341757
1.096145
1.324612
1.000012
.6789124
2.032472
.2706183

Random-effects Parameters
settlement: Identity
sd(_cons)

=
=

56398
1792

Obs per group: min =
avg =
max =

1
31.5
1718

Wald chi2(10)
Prob > chi2

Std. Err.
.6516096
.0897874
.0707999
.0233128
.0827371
.0218257
.0614352
.0000182
.0798245
.2083423
.0396221

z
2.42
13.58
7.36
-3.10
48.73
4.61
6.06
0.64
-3.29
6.92
-8.93

=
=

2667.83
0.0000

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.016
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.520
0.001
0.000
0.000

1.151987
1.731628
1.304731
.8803317
3.183467
1.054192
1.209512
.999976
.5391779
1.662535
.2031093

3.865079
2.084092
1.582693
.9717535
3.507918
1.139769
1.450666
1.000047
.8548609
2.484727
.3605657

Estimate

Std. Err.

[95% Conf. Interval]

1.775377

.0446469

1.689992

1.865076

LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) = 13776.15 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
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Chapter 6. DISCUSSION
From the statistical results, we can see that greater tenure security can mean more
likelihood of having cement floors in poor households in the two Bangladeshi cities. Those
renting or owning their property are more likely to invest in their house than squatters. This
finding again proves the possible positive impacts of interventions targeting tenure security
in order to encourage housing investment leading to better housing and living conditions.
However, unlike what I assume, people who own the house are actually less likely
to have cement floors than renters of non-government properties. This leads back to the
discussion about use value vs. exchange values of the property. For those owning the house,
they mostly enjoy the use values of the property. Poor people might have other priority for
expenditure such as food or schooling of their kids than improving the living space. The
rental units can be seen as a form of business investment. As a result, increase in exchange
values of the properties can encourage the actual owner of the units to spend more on the
structure, especially in the case of non-government land. This case of household in
Bangladeshi poor communities has shown that the ability to participate in the housing
market and benefit from the property can significantly influence the housing investment.
Although some stable rights to the property either through renting or owning do
have positive impacts on the likelihood of having more permanent housing structure, there
are also other very important factors influencing the investment in housing. One interesting
finding is the importance of road conditions and proximity to the railroad. This finding can
support the argument that the ability to benefit from the exchanging (or renting in this case)
of the house encourages the owners of the unit to invest more on the structure.
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Neighborhoods with better conditions such as access to railroad or more developed road
system tend to have higher property value. More people are willing to buy or rent houses
in these areas due to the accessibility and convenience driving up the exchange values.
Property owners then have more incentive to keep the structure maintained and even
improved with more permanent materials like cement.
Results from this research confirm positive impact of increased legal rights on
housing condition, shown through physical housing structure. However, the findings also
suggest even a stronger impact of returns to investment through the increase in exchange
values on housing condition. Rental units or in properties with good access to infrastructure
like road or railroad are good opportunities, which can promise greater return to
investment. Besides the impacts from improved tenure security, the direct effects due
benefiting from the housing market on investment in housing is considerable. The next
chapter will go deeper in the implications of these findings for policy makers as well as
future research.
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Chapter 7. IMPLICATION
For policy makers:
The findings suggest that allowing greater sense of tenure security through having
rental contract or title might encourage people to improve their physical living structure.
However, the finding of greater likelihood of renters of nongovernment units than owner
occupants to have cement floors suggests that housing can also be seen as a form of
business opportunity beside a living space. This could be meaningful for policies making
in terms of economic development. For the population groups such as elderly or disabled
people, who struggle to benefit from many other economic development efforts such as
creating jobs or training, having chance to benefit from their own housing asset might be
very important. The findings of importance of access to railroad and road infrastructure
also contribute to this idea of looking at housing as not only a living space but also a
business opportunity. Lifting neighborhood characteristics such as access to infrastructure
and amenities can contribute to greater investment in housing since people can see a greater
chance of good return to their investment through either selling or renting out their
property.
However, whether the focus is on improving people’s living quality in terms of
housing quality and quantity or on helping people to have greater business opportunities
will influence the way policies are directed to. Future interventions should be aware of and
balance both of these two aspects of housing in order to be more effective in terms of
improving people’s life especially in poor urban communities.
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Not only the government but also other agency working on improving housing and
living conditions of the poor in Bangladesh can utilize the results from this research. The
NUPRP, who provide datasets enabling the conduct of this study, has been working on and
advocating for comprehensive solutions for urban issues in Bangladeshi poor settlements.
From the findings we can see that improving neighborhood characteristics such as road,
drainage systems or access to other amenities can have impacts on housing conditions.
Hence this can be considered for effective solutions.
For future research:
While the current literature about housing in poor communities heavily focuses on
providing better quality and quantity of housing for people, this research suggests that
market forces also influence people’s decision in terms of their housing. It is important for
future research, especially on poor communities to also take into account this aspect of
housing in order to better understand the issues.
The suggested model seems to be meaningful in providing more insights about the
pattern of housing investment in poor communities in the two cities of Narayanganj and
Chandpur. It might be useful for future research to consider this to explore the same issue
in the context of other cities in Bangladesh as well as other countries especially in the
developing world. However, additional information about differences in cultures, size, the
market and political systems to name just a few are very important if this model and results
are considered in other contexts.
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APPENDIX
Logistic regression with owner occupants group as reference

Logistic regression

Number of obs
Wald chi2(10)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log pseudolikelihood = -33981.033

=
=
=
=

56398
688.93
0.0000
0.1144

(Std. Err. adjusted for 1792 clusters in settlement)

cement

Odds Ratio

rent_gov
rent_nongov
squat
female
tv
road
dis_cen
dependent
river_1km
rail_1km
_cons

1.136992
1.9649
.7158663
.9579083
3.27865
1.256122
.9999606
1.346735
.9153815
1.363209
.2725952

Robust
Std. Err.
.3707693
.1316184
.1218763
.0369644
.2239816
.0612504
.0000184
.0904665
.1230328
.1740167
.0386219
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z
0.39
10.08
-1.96
-1.11
17.38
4.68
-2.14
4.43
-0.66
2.43
-9.17

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.694
0.000
0.050
0.265
0.000
0.000
0.032
0.000
0.511
0.015
0.000

.6000446
1.72315
.5127607
.8881313
2.867775
1.141631
.9999246
1.1806
.703389
1.061462
.2064991

2.154425
2.240568
.9994225
1.033167
3.748392
1.382094
.9999966
1.536248
1.191266
1.750734
.3598473

